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Quantum Private Comparison (QPC) allows us to protect private information during its compar-
ison. In the past various three-party quantum protocols have been proposed that claim to work well
under noisy conditions. Here we tackle the problem of QPC under noise. We analyze the EPR-
based protocol under depolarizing noise, bit flip and phase flip noise. We show how noise affects the
robustness of the EPR-based protocol. We then present a straightforward protocol based on CSS
codes to perform QPC which is robust against noise and secure under general attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum ideas have led to surprising developments in
the field of secure communication. The most startling
example is that of cryptography, where quantum ideas
have revolutionized the field. While most classical cryp-
tography schemes depend on computational complexity
for their security, quantum cryptographic schemes [1–
3, 11] offer security based on physical laws. There have
been further developments such as quantum secure di-
rect communication [4, 10, 19], quantum secret shar-
ing [15, 16, 31], quantum authentication and quantum
signatures [9, 21, 33, 38].
Secure multi-party computation allows several dis-
trustful parties to jointly compute a function while keep-
ing their inputs private [36], and is of fundamental im-
portance in secure communication. A particular instance
is to compute the equality function with just two par-
ties [36]. Quantum Private Comparison (QPC) aims to
do the above computation without sharing the party’s
private information. This is in contrast to quantum key
distribution (QKD) which provides a secure way to share
private information.
Let Alice and Bob have private information MA and
MB respectively. QPC involves the computation of the
function f(MA,MB) such that
f(MA,MB) =
{
0 if MA = MB
1 if MA 6= MB (1)
Furthermore, at the end of the protocol Alice and Bob do
not wish the other party to learn anything about their
information, apart from what can be inferred logically
from f(MA,MB). Lo [22] pointed out that the above
function f(MA,MB) cannot be computed securely by two
parties alone. Hence a third party is needed to facilitate
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the process. One might think that a three-party QPC is
trivial. Both Alice and Bob can convey their information
to a trusted third party (Charlie) and he can tell Alice
and Bob the outcome of the function f . The problem
here is a little different; Alice and Bob do not wish to
disclose their information to anyone, including Charlie
and yet wish to compare their private information. In
fact, they do not want to transmit the information at
all. In the past several three-party quantum protocols
have been proposed [8, 32, 34, 35, 39]. They impose the
following restriction on the third party:
(a) Charlie tries to learn information about Alice and
Bob’s input while being restricted to faithfully fol-
low the protocol. In other words he is semi-honest
or honest but curious.
(b) Charlie may know the positions at which MA and
MB differ, but not the actual bit values.
Further, these protocols assume that all channels are
noiseless or remain silent on this aspect. We show that
under the proposed restrictions, we can build a protocol
to achieve QPC even under noisy conditions. A slight
modification of our protocol allows us to relax the con-
dition, that Charlie is honest. That is, he may not coop-
erate with Alice and Bob and return False results. We
also show how our protocol is more efficient than similar
quantum protocols [39].
It is hard to build perfect quantum channels and hence
we must build protocols that are robust against noise. We
choose a specific protocol described by Tseng et. al. [32]
and add noise to its channels. We consider depolarizing
noise, bit flip and phase flip noise. We show that the
protocol as such, is not robust under noise. We note that
three-party QPC involves transmission of correlated keys
between the parties, and that under noise these correla-
tions are altered. Quantum error correction helps over-
come the effects of noise. We note that quantum error
correction and quantum cryptography have a deep con-
nection [29]. Exploiting this connection, we use the CSS
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2quantum error correction scheme [30] to transmit corre-
lated keys to relevant parties under noisy conditions in
a secure manner. This allows us to perform three-party
QPC under noisy conditions. Further, by repeated use
of our protocol and through cooperation between Alice
and Bob, any dishonesty on the part of Charlie can also
be detected.
II. EPR-BASED QPC PROTOCOL AND NOISE
We review the EPR-based QPC protocol given in [32].
Alice and Bob have n bit strings MA and MB respec-
tively. They want to compare their information with the
help of a semi-honest third party called Charlie. Let
Alice, Bob and Charlie be connected by noiseless quan-
tum channels that can be eavesdropped upon and clas-
sical channels that can be eavesdropped upon but not
altered. For each qubit, we consider the computational
basis |0〉 and |1〉 and define the rotated basis state as
|+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) and |−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉). For pairs of
qubits the four Bell states are defined as
|φ±〉 = |00〉 ± |11〉√
2
, |ψ±〉 = |01〉 ± |10〉√
2
. (2)
Using these resources over the quantum channels and
classical communication over the classical channels, the
secure QPC protocol proceeds as follows:
Protocol 1.
1. Charlie prepares a random n bit string CT . For
each bit of CT he prepares a quantum state. If the
bit is 0 then he prepares one of the states from |φ±〉
(it does not matter which). Otherwise, he prepares
one of the states from |ψ±〉. Sequence TA consists
of the first half of each of these entangled pairs,
while TB consists of the second halves.
2. Charlie prepares two sets of decoysDA andDB ran-
domly in the states: |0〉, |1〉, |+〉 and |−〉. Charlie
randomly interleaves DA with TA and DB with TB
to form SA and SB , which are then sent to Alice
and Bob respectively.
3. Upon receipt of the complete sequences SA and SB ,
Alice and Bob signal Charlie to disclose the po-
sitions and the basis ({|0〉, |1〉} or {|−〉, |+〉}) for
measuring the decoys.
4. Alice and Bob measure the decoys in the appro-
priate basis and consult over a classical channel to
check for eavesdroppers. If the error rate is more
than a predetermined rate then they abort the pro-
tocol, else they proceed.
5. Alice and Bob measure the non-decoy particles in
the Z basis to obtain bit strings RA and RB respec-
tively. Note that each of RA and RB are uniformly
random while RA ⊕RB = CT .
6. Alice and Bob calculate CA = MA⊕RA and CB =
MB ⊕RB . They cooperate to calculate C = CA ⊕
CB and send it to Charlie.
7. Charlie computes Rc = C ⊕ CT . Rc has a single
non-zero entry if and only if MA 6= MB , in which
case Charlie outputs 1, otherwise he outputs 0.
It is not hard to see that in the absence of noise
and eavesdropping, the protocol computes the function
f(MA,MB) with certainty. We note that if an eaves-
dropper (Eve) passes undetected then the output of the
protocol can be different from f(MA,MB) because Eve
can tamper with the non-decoy particles (she may cause
RA ⊕ RB 6= CT ) and make the protocol malfunction. It
has been shown that the above protocol is secure against
certain insider and outsider attacks [32] and hence com-
putes f(MA,MB) with very high probability.
A. One qubit noisy channels
In the QPC protocol described above, perfect (noise-
less) single qubit quantum channels between Alice, Bob
and Charlie have been employed. In any real situation,
noise can act on these channels in a number of ways.
Therefore, we need to consider noisy one qubit channels
instead of noiseless channels and explore the possibility
of carrying out QPC over these noisy channels. We be-
gin by describing the noisy channels and then figure out
their effect on the EPR-based QPC protocol.
The bit flip channel with error probability 1 − p is
defined through its action on a one qubit density operator
ρ via the action of the bit flip gate X as
F(ρ) = (1− p)XρX† + pρ. (3)
Similarly, the phase flip channel with error probability
1 − p is described through the action of the phase flip
gate Z as
G(ρ) = (1− p)ZρZ† + pρ. (4)
The depolarizing channel with error probability p is
H(ρ) = (1− p)ρ+ p
3
(XρX† + Y ρY † + ZρZ†). (5)
The above equation admits the interpretation that the
state is acted upon by each Pauli operator with proba-
bility
p
3 and remains unchanged with probability 1− p.
B. QPC and depolarizing channels
Let both the channels between Alice and Charlie (AC)
and between Bob and Charlie (BC) suffer from depolariz-
ing noise. If the error represented by the Pauli matrix σA
acts on the AC channel and the error represented by σB
affects the BC channel then we call the combined error
3σAσB . From equation (5) we see that under depolarizing
noise the channel acts such that each Pauli matrix acts
on the qubit with equal probability p3 . Since both the
channels AC and BC are independent the errors act in-
dependently. Hence, the probability for an XAXB error
is
p
3 ·
p
3 . If an error acts such that it takes the state |φ±〉 to
the state |ψ±〉 or vice-versa then the protocol will return
an incorrect answer. This happens because the flipping
of a correlated to an anti-correlated state and vice-versa,
makes the string CT an unfaithful record of the positions
at which RA and RB differ. After the error has acted
CT 6= C ′T where
C ′T ≡ RA ⊕RB (6)
So in step 7 of Protocol 1, Charlie gets Rc = (CT ⊕C ′T )⊕
(MA ⊕MB) instead of Rc = MA ⊕MB .
Under the action of depolarizing noise mentioned in
equation (5) the probability that the state changes from
|φ±〉 to |ψ±〉 or vice-versa is r = 4p3 (1− 2p3 ), which means
that the probability that CT and C
′
T differ at a given po-
sition is r. Even if there is a difference at a single position
in CT and C
′
T the protocol will give wrong results. Let n
be the length of the strings and P (CT = C
′
T ) the proba-
bility that CT = C
′
T . It is straightforward to see that
P (CT 6= C ′T ) = 1− P (CT = C ′T )
= 1− (1− r)n (7)
Hence the protocol [32] is not robust against any amount
of depolarizing noise. For large n and small r, the error
is linear in r.
C. Bit and Phase Flip channels and QPC
Consider bit flip and phase flip noise in channels AC
and BC. Suppose bit flip (3) acts with probability p and
phase flip (4) with probability q. The combined action
of the error is given by
F ◦ G(ρ) = G ◦ F(ρ)
= (1− q)pXρX + (1− p)qZρZ + pqY ρY
+ (1− q)(1− p)ρ. (8)
Equation (8) gives the total action of noise on each chan-
nel. Let the length of CT and C
′
T be n, then
P (CT 6= C ′T ) = 1− (1− 2p(1− p))n. (9)
Hence the protocol [32] is robust against phase flip but
not bit flip noise. For large n and small p, the error is
linear in p.
We see that due to depolarizing noise and bit flip noise
in the communication channels between Alice (Bob) and
Charlie, the protocol returns incorrect results. This is
because noise alters the quantum state being sent and
consequently the string RA and RB . This alteration re-
sults in CT (the string with Charlie) becoming an un-
faithful record of the correlations between RA and RB .
In general, channels are noisy and any protocol fit for
implementation must be robust against noise. Hence we
need to design protocols that work even under noisy con-
ditions.
III. CSS CODE BASED PROTOCOL
In order to perform three-party QPC under noise it
is necessary to preserve the information encoded in the
quantum states being sent by Charlie to Alice (Bob).
This will ensure that CT remains a faithful record of the
correlations. One way to achieve this, is through error
correction on the quantum states being sent to convey
RA and RB . We utilize CSS codes to perform error cor-
rection [30]. We note that these codes have a deep con-
nection with QKD [29].
We propose a protocol for QPC that is robust under
noise and completely secure from attacks. The basic idea
is to use the CSS codes to securely transfer a known key
from Charlie to Alice and Bob. This allows the QPC
to work perfectly under noise as long as the bit (phase)
error rate is under an acceptable limit.
A. CSS Codes
We review the CSS codes [6, 30] and the protocol for
using CSS codes to perform a secure key distribution of
a known random key.
Suppose C1 and C2 are [n, k1] and [n, k2] classical linear
codes such that {0} ⊂ C2 ⊂ C1 ⊂ Fn2 , C1 and CT2 both
correct t errors. Then CSS(C1, C2) is an [n, k1 − k2]
quantum error correcting code capable of correcting t
qubit errors. For x ∈ C1 we define a code state
|x+ C2〉 ≡ 1√|C2|
∑
y∈C2
|x⊕ y〉 (10)
where ⊕ is summation modulo 2. If x, x′ belong to the
same coset in C2 i.e. x − x′ = y′ ∈ C2 then they de-
fine the same code state, hence the total number of dis-
tinct code states is the number of cosets of C2 in C1,
|C1|/|C2| = 2k1−k2 . Each code state can be used to en-
code a distinct n bit classical string. This can then be
exchanged between interested parties.
The code state can get affected by noise in the channel,
which we must be able to correct. It is sufficient to write
the corrupted code state as
1√|C2|
∑
y∈C2
(−1)(x+y).e2 |x⊕ y ⊕ e1〉 (11)
where e1 is the n bit string with a non-zero entry only at
positions where a bit flip has occurred and e2 is a similar
n bit string for phase flips. By correcting both these kind
of errors we can correct any kind of error [6, 30]. In order
to detect and correct errors we consider σa(k) the Pauli
4matrix acting on the kth bit, where a(k) ∈ {x, y, z}. The
operator σ
[l]
a is defined as
σ[l]a = σ
l1
a(1) ⊕ σl2a(2) ⊕ · · · ⊕ σlna(n) (12)
l is an n bit string and its ith entry is li that takes values
from {0, 1}. By definition σ0a(k) = I. Note that eigenval-
ues of σa(k) are ±1.
In classical error correction if F is a parity check matrix
for a code M , an error y affecting the code word p giving
p′ = p+y has syndrome Fp′ = Fy (Fp = 0 by definition).
This syndrome is used to determine the most likely error
y. Note that the mth entry of the column vector Fy is
fm · p′ mod 2, where fm is the mth row in F .
For correcting the quantum state in Equation (11), we
employ a measurement protocol along similar lines. Let
H1 be the parity check matrix for C1 and H2 for C
T
2 (the
dual code of C2). If l is the i
th row of H1 then we deter-
mine the ith column entry for the bit flip error syndrome
H1 ·e1 by measuring σ[l]z with the understanding that the
eigenvalue 1(−1) is mapped to 0(1). Thus by measuring
σ
[l]
z for each row l ∈ H1 we obtain the full syndrome. The
ith column entry for the phase flip error syndrome H2 ·e2
is similarly obtained by measuring σ
[l′]
x where l′ is the
ith row of H2. From these syndromes we can accurately
get back e1 and e2 using classical linear coding theory
as long as wt(e1) ≤ t and wt(e2) ≤ t respectively. We
then correct the corrupted state and retrieve the encoded
state
1√|C2|
∑
y∈C2
|x⊕ y〉 (13)
A generalized CSS(C1, C2) code for any two n-bit
strings x and z can be defined as
|v+C2〉 ≡ 1√|C2|
∑
w∈C2
(−1)z.w|v⊕x⊕w〉 v ∈ C1 (14)
We may use these code states. Let s ≡ (x, z) then we
denote the quantum code with the above code states as
Qs. For x = 0 and z = 0 Qs reduces to CSS(C1, C2).
If we measure σ
[l]
z (l ∈ H1) and σl′x (l′ ∈ H2) on code
state (14) then we will obtain syndromes corresponding
to H1x and H2z respectively. If there was a bit flip er-
ror e1 and a phase flip error e2 on the code state (14)
then our syndrome measurements would be correspond-
ing to H1(x + e1) and H2(z + e2). We can recover the
error with the understanding that we must subtract x
and z to retrieve the e1 and e2 respectively. If we per-
form syndrome measurements on any state |ψ〉 and ob-
tain that the syndrome are both null vectors then we
can conclude |ψ〉 = |v + C2〉 v ∈ C1 for some v. The
syndrome measurement projects the state |ψ〉 into the
subspace spanned by |v + C2〉, v ∈ C1. Alternatively,
if we obtain syndromes corresponding to H1.x and H2.z
for bit and phase flip respectively, then we may conclude
that |ψ〉 has been projected onto a subspace spanned by
code states of Qs, s = (x, z).
B. The Protocol
Let us first describe the CSS based protocol for shar-
ing a known randomly chosen secret key. Let us assume
that a secret key is to be distributed between Alice and
Charlie.
Protocol 2.
1. Alice creates n random check bits, a random m bit
key k and a random 2n bit string b.
2. Alice generates s = (x, z) by choosing n-bit strings
x and z at random.
3. Alice encodes her key k as |k〉 using the CSS code
Qs.
4. Alice chooses n positions (out of 2n) and puts the
check bits in these positions and the code bits in
the remaining positions.
5. Alice applies a Hadamard transform to those qubits
in those positions where b is 1.
6. Alice sends the resulting state to Charlie. He ac-
knowledges the receipt once he receives all qubits.
7. Alice announces b, the positions of the check bits,
the values of the check bits and the strings s.
8. Charlie performs Hadamard on the qubits where b
is 1.
9. Charlie checks whether too many of the check bits
have been corrupted, and aborts the protocol if so.
10. With the help of s, Charlie decodes the key bits
and uses them for the key.
The above protocol works correctly and is uncondition-
ally secure as long as the noise is under a given threshold
value [29]. The protocol for carrying out QPC under
noisy conditions is as follows
Protocol 3.
1. Charlie generates a random n bit string RA and
uses the CSS Code based quantum error correction
protocol(Protocol 2) to send it to Alice.
2. Charlie generates a random n bit string CT and
computes RB = RA ⊕ CT
3. Charlie uses Protocol 2 to send RB to Bob.
4. Alice and Bob compute CA = MA⊕RA and CB =
RB ⊕MB .
5. Alice and Bob collaborate together to compute
C = CA ⊕ CB and send it to Charlie over a public
channel.
5AliceMA
BobMB
Charlie CT
RA
RB
CA
CB
C
FIG. 1. The schematic diagram of the protocol where Charlie
generates random strings RA and CT , using the CSS based
protocol he sends RA to Alice and RB = RA⊕ CT to Bob over
the noisy channels. Alice and Bob encode their respective
messages MA and MB in CA and CB . They collaborate to
compute C = CA ⊕ CB and send it via a public channel to
Charlie.
6. Charlie computes Rc = C ⊕ CT . Rc has a single
non-zero entry if and only if MA 6= MB , in which
case Charlie outputs 1, otherwise he outputs 0
The entire process is summarized in Figure 1. It is easy
to see that in the absence of noise and eavesdropping the
protocol computes the function f(MA,MB) correctly. In
the presence of noise alone the CSS based scheme can
transmit keys correctly as long as noise is within an ac-
ceptable level (the current acceptable level of bit(phase)
flip errors is 20.0% [7, 14]). When both noise and eaves-
dropping are allowed the protocol is secure and gives cor-
rect results with very high probability. We now show
the security and correctness in the presence of noise and
eavesdropping. We note that participant attacks are
stronger than non-participant attacks since participants
always have more information. We consider attacks by
Alice and Bob to demonstrate the security of the proto-
col.
Consider an attack by Alice to gain information about
MB . She can attack the transmission channel between
Bob and Charlie, and try to extract information by per-
forming any physical operation permitted by quantum
mechanics. Alternatively she may exploit side channel
attacks which exploit loopholes in the devices used to
implement key distribution [5, 12, 13, 17, 18, 25–27, 37].
These two are fundamentally different kinds to attack.
Let us first analyze a direct attack on the transmission
by Alice. She has access to MA, CB , CA and RA. We
may assume that MA contains no information about MB .
We note MB = RB ⊕ CB , hence information about RB
implies information about MB and vice-versa. Alice can
gain information about RB through CT (RB = CT⊕RA),
alternatively she may intercept the communication be-
tween Bob and Charlie. The semi-honest nature of Char-
lie ensures that Alice does not learn anything about CT .
We know [23, 29] that once Bob and Charlie authenti-
cate the CSS protocol the probability that intercepts by
Alice go undetected is exponentially close to 1. In the
event the protocol is authenticated Alice’s mutual infor-
mation about the key (MB) is exponentially small. So,
any attack by Alice on the communication between Bob
and Charlie cannot help her gain more than an expo-
nentially small amount of information about RB without
going undetected with a probability exponentially close
to 1. So with very high probability, attacks by Alice are
unsuccessful.
Consider an attack by Alice on the devices used to im-
plement the CSS based key distribution scheme. A CSS
based scheme can be turned into an equivalent modified
BB-84 scheme [29], we need only analyze attacks on the
latter to discuss the security of the former. Implemen-
tations of QKD employ devices that may not adhere to
the strict assumptions made while proving their uncon-
ditional security. This allows for side channels for eaves-
droppers to attack. These attacks can also be tackled.
One can use measurement-device-independent quantum
key distribution [24] and appropriate experimental de-
signs [20, 28] to achieve this. Specifically it has been
shown that we can implement key distribution such that
it is immune to all side channel attacks [28].
In the event the attacks are unsuccessful, then we need
only care about the noise. But as we saw earlier the CSS
protocol is robust as long as the noise is under an accept-
able level. Since the protocol is symmetric with respect
to Alice and Bob, any attacks by Bob are also ruled out.
We note that Charlie has access to RA, RB , CT and
C and is restricted to be semi-honest. It is easy to see
that under these restrictions, he can gain no information
about MA or MB .
C. Dishonest Third Party
It is possible to modify our protocol to achieve three
party QPC for weaker conditions on the third party. We
allow the third party to be dis-honest, in the sense that
he may return incorrect comparisons to Alice and Bob.
We note that by providing false results Charlie does not
stand to gain any information about the private strings
of Alice and Bob. We adapt the technique from [39]
for our purposes. Alice and Bob, share m strings whose
values are known to them. They repeat the QPC pro-
tocol(as described above) m + 1 times. They compare
m known strings and 1 secret string. Their secret strings
are compared at some random repetition, known to Alice
and Bob but unknown to Charlie. This prevents Charlie
from being dishonest. In the event Charlie tries to give
false information to Alice and Bob, he is caught with high
probability(1− 1m+ 1).
6IV. CONCLUSIONS
We analyze EPR based three-party QPC under noisy
conditions and show that it is not robust under any
amount of bit flip noise and depolarizing noise. We then
present a CSS based protocol that is robust against noise
and secure under general attacks, as long as the noise is
under an acceptable rate.
It is important to compare our work with the avail-
able classical and quantum protocols in the litera-
ture. Recently a protocol using Quantum Key Distri-
bution(QKD) [39] have been proposed. This protocol
does not consider noisy channels or side channel attacks.
Though it is possible from our analysis above, to extend
their work to the noisy channel case. In terms of re-
sources, for the case of a semi-honest third party, their
protocol achieves QPC using 4 QKD relays each sharing
n bits of information. In comparison our protocols uses 2
QKD like relays, decreasing the quantum resources and
communication complexity by a factor of 2. However,
the overall communication complexity and quantum re-
sources(in terms of entangled states used to implement a
QKD) are still O(n).
Several classical protocols have been designed to per-
form two-party and multi-party secure computation.
These protocols either work under an honest major-
ity [40] or a Common Reference String(CRS) along
with complexity assumptions [41] or demand access to
a trusted dealer [42] (implemented using public key tech-
nique) but are able to tackle both passive and active
adversaries. It is well known that certain complexity as-
sumptions such as absence of polynomial time algorithms
for prime factorization or discrete logarithm are invalid
when the adversary has access to quantum resources [43].
On the other hand it is possible to use classical public-
key cryptosystems based on the hardness of learning with
errors [44]. These cryptosystems cannot be broken by
quantum algorithms presently known to us. Implemen-
tations of public key cryptosystems are expensive but can
be done with O(poly(n)) classical resources. In our work
we consider only 2 parties and propose a protocol to com-
pute a single function (equality) but allow the parties to
be corrupted by an adversary who however does not in-
ject incorrect information into the protocol. While we
do not need complexity assumptions we do need secure
channels between the interested parties and we take into
account the resources expended in creating secure chan-
nels. In our proposal the resources (classical and quan-
tum) utilized to implement the protocol from scratch are
linear in the size of the input. Our proposal based on pre-
vious work demands a trusted third party but we show
how that assumption can be relaxed by repeating the pro-
tocol several times, consequently incurring a cost which
is still linear in the size of the input.
We note that our protocol no longer uses EPR states,
but requires the used of CSS code states. In order to
send CSS encoded information we may require multi-
qubit channels. In order to perform QPC under noise
we exploit the connection between CSS codes and key
distribution. This enables us to provide unconditional
security for QPC in real time implementation schemes.
It would be interesting to see if other QPC protocols
that use d level quantum systems or Greenberger-Horne-
Zeilinger (GHZ) states can also be made uncondition-
ally secure against all possible attacks. It would also be
worthwhile to explore protocols that work under milder
restrictions on the third party and protocols that can
work for multi-party and implement a wider class of func-
tions.
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